



A Study of Armed Struggle Until the Battle of Badr: Quranic and Historical Presentations

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Abstract:

The research adopts the hypothesis that the historical presentation of the armed conflict between Muslims and polytheists in the Code of the Prophet's Biography has been formulated in a completely different way to the Qur'anic rooting of many of the details of this conflict and its events, which generated two contradictory images of this trend. It seems that this reverts to political and intellectual factors imposed by the era of Recording, or The development of the geography of political Islam, and the predominance of the Islam of history over the Islam of the Qur'an.

Keywords: Battle of Badr, military conflict, Quran, history. Introduction

Introduction

Many aspects were clarified in Quran in detail or mere simple references. However, the historical heritage presents another understanding of the exact details: it may display some neglected information in the Quran. In other words, it may show a completely different picture of what is there in the Quran.

For example, the personality of the Prophet in the Quran is different from that of the books of biography and history: in Quran, he is of great morality, tender heart, divine mercy to all people. On the other hand, he is of bad temper in history books who swears and curses for the most trivial situations. Abu Huraira narrates that the Prophet stated: O Allah, Muhammed is only a human who gets angry like any other person. God, I have pledged that any believer whom I hurt, curse, or hit make it a ransom and a means that approximate them to You.¹ In another narration, he said: "any believer I revile²." In the narration of Aisha, she said: "once two men visited the Prophet, but he dealt with them with a bad temper and reviled them! I told the Prophet: O Messenger of Allah, people always meet you with charity and goodness, not these two men. He replied: do not you know my pledge with my Lord? He said: O Allah, any believer whom I swear, hit, or curse, make it a ransom for him..."³.

The Prophet is the same man who is not just and fair among his wives until they complain about him⁴. Moreover, he is represented as a man who falls in love with his foster son's wife and marries her! The great Al-Tabari mentions that "the Prophet once saw Zainab bint Jahash, the wife of his foster-son, Zaid. When Zaid recognized this issue, he could no longer love his wife because the Prophet had already fallen in love with her. He then decided to divorce her⁵. Al-Thalabi and Al-Wahedi also mention: "The Prophet saw her standing with her veils on; he fell in love with her."⁶ Al-Bagawi adds: "He saw Zainab in her veils. She was of white complexion and beautiful. He fell in love with her and her beauty"⁷. Al-Qurtobi also adds: "He saw Zainab standing. She was of



white complexion and perfect body, the best among Quraish's women. Then he fell in love with her. It is said that God has sent a breeze to remove her veil. Zainab was in her nightgown in her house.⁸ The Prophet saw Zainab and fell in love with her. Zainab had already recognized that the Prophet loved her when he asked her hand for Zaid"⁹.

The Prophet is represented in the books of history as a man who is cruel to his enemies. He is a man who chops off the hands and feet of his enemies; he also gouges out their eyes¹⁰. The same case of forgery is also observed for the companions of the Prophet. Some of them are rebuked and accused of hypocrisy, in addition to blasphemy, but in the books of history, they all are pious and dependable¹¹. Al-Qurtobi mentions: "All the companions are righteous, lovers of Allah and His chosen ones. They are the best of the creation after the prophets. This is the belief of Sunnahs, and upon this, all the imams of the Muslims have agreed¹².

Many other examples deviate from reality at the expense of the truth of the Quran. Moreover, history books are the standards upon which Quran must be measured. There are several cases in which the declaration of the Quran is neglected only to adopt what history books mention. For instance, the idea of the first caliph Abu Bakr was adopted though there is a clear Quranic verse that clarifies something different. Lady Fatima was rejected for her inheritance only because the caliph has narrated a single-narrated Hadith¹³. He claimed that the Prophet said: "we the prophets do not inherit inheritance behind. What is left behind is categorized as charity"¹⁴. He confiscated the land of Fadak, which the Prophet gifted to his daughter Fatima in his life¹⁵. Ironically, after the throne of the caliphate became stable, he defied narrating any Hadith from the Prophet, claiming that it would lead to confusion and may take the place of the Quran¹⁶.

This research seeks to highlight a critical event in the life of the Prophet. It was observed and explained in Quran. However, history books represented it differently, to the extent that most of its features have been lost or deformed. We are talking about the decision of the Prophet to bury the well of Badr with rocks and stones.

First: Armed Call for Islam in Quran and the Life of the Prophet

History books show that in the battle of Badr, the Muslims took the decision of war and attacked the Quraish caravans. They claim that this decision was a reaction to the Muslims' oppression. On the other hand, Quraish is represented as the one who does not wish to enter any armed conflict with the Muslims, as if they only wanted to get rid of the Prophet and cast him away from Mecca.

According to the methodology that seeks to hide the virtues of Imam Ali, these books mention

that Quraish did not mind his family joining him after he migrated to Medina; they did not chase him outside the city, let alone waging war against him. As a result, the Prophet decided to attack their caravans and harm their economy. They became the standard viewpoint of the orientalist towards the Prophet and his strategies¹⁷.

When these books discuss the attacks of Hamza bin Adul Mutalib, Ubaida bin Al-Harith bin Al-Mutalib, Saad bin Abi Al-Waqas, Abdullah bin Jahash on Quraish, and the battles of Wadan, Bawat, Al-Ashira, the first Badr¹⁸, they present these events as spontaneous decisions taken by the Muslims without any danger from Quraish. This contradicts the Quranic verse in which God clarifies that they need permission for such decisions: o those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;- and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid” Al-Hajj: 39.

We see that the Muslims never decide armed confrontation unless they are obliged, as in the battles of Uhud, Khandaq, the fighting with the Jews, Hunain, Tabook, and others. Even in those battles, the Prophet never starts the fight unless they do.

This clearly shows the contradiction between those battles on the decision of the Prophet to delay the conclusion of the war. The question in this regard is whether this deviation of the military methodology of the Prophet with the unbelievers had any effect on the expanding wars that the caliphs later waged with the neighboring states, under the name of Jihad and expanding Islam with force; whether such historical deformity was an attempt to justify all horrible crimes that were committed by the Islamic armies in the name of the caliphs, when they were looking for war spoils, money, and women to quench their leaders’ desires. The problem with such historical forgery is that some people now take it as a standard to spread terror and destruction. Today’s slave markets in the name of Islam founded by those who claim to be Muslims are only one result of such forgeries.

The history books claim that the Prophet and the Muslims started waging wars against Quraish and their caravans. In other words, these sources claim that the choice of battle was taken only by the Muslims. Despite Quraish’s military superiority, it never wished to use armed confrontation. They went to Badr only to defend their caravan.¹⁹

If taken with good intention, we may justify what has been mentioned that the Muslims were enthusiastic at supporting Islam; this shows the Muslims as if they always take the first step in wars. After the migration of the Muslims to Medina, they started to plan to take revenge from Quraish. This battle occurred later because the Muslims were busy preparing themselves for the confrontation. Quraish was naturally the first target of the Muslims. This was emphasized by the



Prophet when he sent some regiments to attack the caravans of Quraish. The Prophet himself also participated in those regiments, like Abwa, Bawat, and Ashira. The Muslims also paved the way for such attacks by making alliances with different tribes to guarantee that the caravans of Quraish have no protection, making them more vulnerable to the attacks of the Muslims²⁰.

Muhammed Husain Haikal posed a query on this issue. He believes that it is suspicious if we say that these regiments were meant to fight the caravans of Quraish²¹ because the unit of Hamza was composed of only 30 men, whereas that of Ubaida was of 60 soldiers. As for the regiment of Saad, it was of 8 to 20 men, noting that the forces protecting the caravans outnumbered the Muslims many times. Logically, Quraish multiplied this number after the migration of the Muslims to Medina to protect their fleets from any potential threat. The defending forces were chosen wisely: blood relatives with the Muslim migrants in Medina and their alliance with the tribes the caravans passed. They would never stay motionless in case any threat approached the caravans. Moreover, the Prophet was aware of his unstable status because the pledge of Aqaba sworn by Ansars of Medina states that they would always support the Prophet only in his defensive wars; in this case, he would never take a risky step to ignite unwanted confrontation. In this case, what the historians mention does not match rational assessment of the situations, especially they started recording the life of the Prophet after his death two centuries²².

Haikal concludes that this strategy of the Prophet may be read as a warning message to Quraish that it is best to its trade to come to an understanding with the Muslims of Medina and to narrow the circle of hostility between its alliances those of the Muslims in Medina. Quraish would come into peace with the Muslims when it recognizes that its caravans and trade are endangered by the same people who were already outcasted from Mecca. The Muslims may further find the space to spread Islam into other territories and conquest Mecca. They may use the season of Pilgrimage to call for their religion. Such conclusions were present in the minds of Quraish only if the Muslims showed some power. This might justify the return of Hamza bin Abdul Mutalib and his regiments of 30 knights from Muhajirin after they confronted Abu Jahl in Saif Al-Bahr. Majdi bin Amr Al-Jahni intervened to stop any possible fight. The man was an alliance of the two sides²³.

In this pertain, these moves were a warning to Quraish that the power of the Muslims is increasing fast. They were pushing on Quraish to come to terms of understanding. What supports this reading of the events is that when the Prophet moved to Bawat and That Al-Ashira, only a few Ansar accompanied him. They moved with him only to protect him, not attack any target. The Prophet, moreover, delayed the battle of Badr until he felt the psychological preparation of An-

sar. The pledge of Aqaba was only to protect the Prophet and not wage any war on his enemies. Because the decision of war was not an easy one because the Arabs were related either in blood or in alliances. Despite all the Prophet's alliances with other tribes, it was not enough to qualify them to attack Quraish or wage war²⁴.

Despite all these, Quraish still held the higher hand in the scene because even the tribes that swore allegiance with the Prophet never cared about the Islamic call and religious conversion; they had mutual religious belief with Quraish as well as some previously declared commitments with Quraish. The latter had financial and economic priority as well. It could easily bribe those tribes to change the front. Thus, labeling those prophetic battles as 'Gazwa' springs from the historians' cultural backgrounds in which conquest and attacking others was a norm. They recorded those historical events depending on their Arabian cultural traits. In this regard, they labeled the defensive movements of the Prophet as 'Gazwa,' borrowing pre-Islamic terms.

Quran also supports this claim. It never mentions any battle in which the Prophet took the first step. They were always obliged to take part in defensive battles, as clarified in the following verses: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;- and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid.. (They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right,- (for no cause) except that they say, "our Lord is Allah" Al-Hajj: 39-40. "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors." Baqara: 190. "O ye who believe! make not unlawful the good things which Allah hath made lawful for you, but commit no excess: for Allah loveth not those given to excess." Maeda: 87. "Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and (instead) send you (Guarantees of) peace, then Allah Hath opened no way for you (to war against them)." Nisa: 90. "O ye who believe! When ye go abroad in the cause of Allah, investigate carefully, and say not to anyone who offers you a salutation: "Thou art none of a believer!" Coveting the perishable goods of this life" Nisa: 94. Other verses emphasize the importance of free choice when it comes to adopting religions; it is also of great importance to call for Islam with the best possible discourse, as in the following verses: "Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious" Nahl: 125. "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error" Baqara: 256. "To you be your Way, and to me mine." Kafirun: 6.

In this regard, we can easily observe contradictions between what the historians mention and the Quranic principles that are clarified in it. In other words, what those history books present



does not match the tenets of the Quran and Islam. Accordingly, we should go beyond the conclusions of Haikal because in case they were true, history books would mention them without any further assessment.

These sources mean precisely what they mean without the need for further interpretation. What concerns us here is why would these historians present the events that defy the moral principles of the Quran?

The first Islamic events were recorded under the supervision of the radical Islamic movements (the Umayyads, Abbasids, and their intelligent systems). These authorities have committed several crimes that oppose the principles of Islam and the Quran. They only sought to quench their thirst for power. They aimed to expand their domination over the regions by forging certain prophetic decisions that match their current chaos. History shows that the wars of these authorities harmed all people, even those who did not take any aggressive steps towards the Muslims. The caliphs initiated all those expanding wars to result in destruction. They also harmed the Muslims: Islamic cities and groups were affiliated. Islamic history is full of such examples, from 'the battles of Radda' and the expanding wars to overcoming any political resistance or potential threat. They never hesitated to crush any opposition, including the Household of the Prophet and their companions. Aggressions, murder, genocide, torture, domination in the name of Islam remained a consistent issue.

This radical system sought to justify their crimes by presenting history in a way that softens the harshness of their crimes. They presented their cruelty as part of Islamic principles and necessary for expanding this religion, though they contradict the principles of the Quran. There are other details in the battles of the Prophet that were forged to match the caliphs' ideological attitudes, like when the Prophet buried the well of Badr and banned the unbelievers from drinking the water²⁵. This example justifies the Umayyads strategy of using the water as a weapon in their fights. Yet, it is evident that this strategy contradicts the morality of Islam. In this sense, the Prophet stated: "three things that should never be banned from anyone: water, food, and fire."²⁶ Thus, the historians were eager to write Islamic history to justify later crimes committed by the caliphs. Accordingly, history was written to offend the Prophet and Islam greatly.

Second: The Battle of Badr and Burying the Wells of Water

Most of the Islamic sources (primary or secondary) mention that the goal of the battle of Badr was to attack the caravan of Quraish and confiscate it on its way back to Mecca. The Prophet said: "This is the caravan of Quraish, carrying its money. Attack it so that Allah may give it to you". Howev-

er, Abu Sufian changed the caravan's route to avoid danger. He, moreover, asked for supporting forces from Mecca. When the Prophet recognized that Quraish was moving towards him in an army, he consulted his companions. After a consensus, they all moved out to confront the army of Quraish²⁷.

These events show that the decision of the Prophet was taken depending upon the situation of Quraish. In other words, the Muslims were not prepared to go to war. Even when the Muslims targeted the caravan, they did not intend any armed confrontation or confiscating it; otherwise, they would get ready for that, noting that it was not difficult to diagnose the exact time of the return of the caravan and their way to home to make an ambush and take over it, before even Quraish recognizing it.

It is clear that even when Quraish moved, the Ansar did not yet decide whether to take part in that battle. This poses the question of the stance of the Ansar and their readiness to face Quraish. It is essential and logical that the Prophet clarify their perspective in such conditions before making any decision. This is clear when the Prophet recognized that Quraish moved to protect their caravan, he consulted the Muslims; Al-Muqdad bin Amr said: "Our beloved Prophet, proceed with what God instructed you, and surely we are with you. I swear by God we never tell you what the Israelites told Moses: You go along with your Lord and fight, we stay waiting here. We tell you: You go with your Lord fight, and we are going with you. I swear by the God who sent you to us, we would accompany you even to the harshest imaginative battles". The Prophet thanked and prayed for him. He also asked for the consultation of Ansar. He was hesitant that Ansar would only stand with him when the enemy attacked him in Medina, and they were not obliged to move outside the city for any battle. Saad bin Maath replied: "I think you want our idea on this issue." The Prophet admitted what he meant. Saad said: "We have believed you and borne witness that what you have revealed to us from God is true. We have sworn allegiance to obey you. So, go wherever you wish, and we are with you. I swear by the God Who sent you, if you dive into the sea, we accompany you, and not even a single man will disobey you. We are of great patience on the battlefield and real fighters. We ask God to give us the strength to meet your expectations. Go under the protection of God". The Prophet was exceptionally pleased with what Saad mentioned. He stated: "Go and be delighted because God has promised me victory. I swear by God I foresee the dead bodies of our enemies²⁸.

The Prophet's strategy was to prove to his enemies (Quraish, the surrounding tribes, and the Jews) that they had risen as a new power in the region. Despite the historians' understanding, the Prophet's tactics sought to prepare the Muslims for later stages of confrontation, which will



be developed to an armed one. He also wanted to make Quraish understand the new power of the Muslims: they are no longer those weak refugees who were cast out of Mecca. This situation proved the loyalty of Ansar, who pledged to support the Prophet in his battles.

Some Muhajerin (represented mainly by Abu Bakr and Omar) expressed their fear of confronting Quraish. This situation revealed a pitfall of their personality compared with Saad and Al-Muqdad when they said: "The Prophet asked people for consultation. The Prophet waited for the reply of Abu Bakr and Omar, but they remained silent. Then, Saad stood up and spoke²⁹. It is said that Abu Bakr and Omar told perfectly³⁰". If this is true, why is their speech not mentioned as that of Al-Muqdad and Saad, and why did the Prophet turn his face from them?

In other sources, including Al-Wawedi and Al-Maqrizi, Omar replies as the following: "O Messenger of God, it is Quraish and its glory we intend to confront. By God, I swear, Quraish has never experienced any defeat. They have never believed in God. They will fight until the very last drop of blood. Be prepared and get ready for everything"³¹. This shows the divided opinions among the Muslims concerning their battle with Quraish. The decision had not been taken yet, because the survey groups needed further information.

However, this does not mean that the Prophet moved haphazardly. He did not depend on sudden decisions and rapid reactions. In addition to divine support, he was very keen in his observations concerning the conditions of both the Muslims and the unbelievers. He never intended to push the events towards confrontation: he was only preparing his forces for any possible threat from the enemy. His acceleration of the circumstances might justify several oppressed Muslims from Mecca and the surrounding areas who wanted to join the Muslim community. Still, they could not take any step under the authority of the unbelievers. Al-Muqdad bin Amr and Utba bin Gazwan in the regiment of Ubaida bin Al-Harith bin Al-Mutalib were among such Muslims³². Others were still waiting for the change of the balance of power. Another group was allies of Quraish and the Jews, waiting for any opportunity to attack the Muslims, as in the battle of Bani Salim; this battle is unfortunately represented as chosen unreasonably by the Prophet because most of the sources mention that when the Prophet came back from the action of Badr, he stayed in Medina only for seven nights, and then moved to the battle of Bani Salim. He reached one of the enemy's pools called Al-Kadr. He stayed there for three nights and then returned to Medina without any armed confrontation.³³

The truth behind this battle is that some people from Bani Salim and Bani Gatfan gathered in that area to attack Medina. Likely, Quraish had already planned it because only seven days separated the battles. The Muslims did not do anything that demanded such a reaction from these two tribes. When the Prophet was informed, he moved towards the gathered tribes with 300

men. When he got there, he met a man from Bani Salim, and the latter told him that the army had scattered and everyone returned home. The Prophet, then, stayed there for three nights and returned to Medina³⁴. Al-Waqedi and Al-Maqrizi also confirm these events. They mention that the Prophet was not harmed: this can be interpreted as there was a third party that intended to harm the Muslims. This shows that when the Muslims moved to battles, it was only a reaction to a particular threat. In other words, the Prophet aimed to make Quraish, the Jews, and their allies understand that the condition of the Muslims has changed dramatically. They are also the owners of game-changing power, and they can react to any possible threat.

Burying the Wells of Badr

History books mention that when the Prophet and his army reached the wells of Badr, he asked his companions: “What do you think about this place? Al-Habab bin Al-Munthur said: our beloved Prophet has no opinion besides God’s instructions. Did He order you to stop here, or is it a war tactic? The Prophet replied: It is a war tactic. Al-Habab said: This is not the place. We should move further to the last wells of water. I know this place very well. There is a very pure well of water; we camp there. We remain only one and bury the others. Gabriel descended to the Prophet and said: follow the advice of Al-Habab. The Prophet thanked him and followed his instructions³⁵.

Judge Eiath wanted to justify this contradiction: “In such worldly matters, there is a possibility that the Prophet commits mistakes. He is not to be blamed because such matters need experiences and practice, whereas the Prophet is aware of only divine issues. As for worldly things, he is not necessarily infallible”. He then mentions some examples in which, the author claims, he committed mistakes.³⁶

Eiath also depends on similar narrations that justify his claim, like the following one: “once the Prophet passed by some farmers who were pollinating palm trees. He asked them: What are you doing? If you stop doing it, it will be better. The farmers followed the instruction of the Prophet. Later, the dates did not ripen. They reported that to the Prophet. He replied: I am only a human: if I tell you something about your religion, abide by it; but when I tell you anything about this world, you may know things more than I do. In this, I am like any other human”³⁷. There is a similar narration: “Once the Prophet passed by a farm of palm trees in Medina. The farmers were estimating the weight of their dates. The Prophet gave them an opinion, and they adopted it. Then the Prophet said: Behold, I am only a human: whatever I tell you about religion is true, and it is from God, but whatever I tell you from myself, it might be true or false because I am only a human”³⁸.

In this regard, the historians of the court of the caliphs throughout the history of this career in Islam were put among two complicated options: they either reject this entire history that is full of



contradictions since it harms the belief of people in the Prophet and his wisdom, rationality, and knowledge, or they start to justify and present illogical interpretations of those events. Unfortunately, they mostly choose the second option. They had to do so because if they rejected this entire historical heritage, they rejected a complete system of narrations about the companions of the Prophet mentioned in the books of Sihah. Doing so means they leave the infallibility of these people. This naturally leads to adopting the infallibility of the Prophet in all cases. This issue is the separating point between Ahlulbait and other Islamic schools. In this case, what those historical figures have committed, mainly Abu Bakr and Omar, and their violating the instructions of the Prophet would be justified. Their disobedience of the Prophet after his martyrdom, starting from Saqifa to this day's chaos and irrational justification of their mistakes, is still continuous. This naturally means the destruction of the Islamic ideological framework and putting all the successive Islamic generations in doubt of their belief. It was a difficult choice for historians. Therefore they decided to adopt the possibility of mistakes in the actions and opinions of the Prophet: he is not necessarily related to divinity. However, this method does not protect these historians from contradiction and irrationality.

Concerning the advice of Al-Habab, he was granted a more sublime title by historians: 'Man of reason³⁹.' Some books mention that he told the Prophet to change the camping site and stay away from Khaibar and its surrounding farms⁴⁰. The next day, he told the Prophet to destroy the palm trees of the Jews. He said: "Messenger of God, the Jews cherish their palm trees even more than their first-born sons." He then ordered them to be destroyed. Later, Abu Bakr came to the Prophet and told him: "Messenger of God, the Lord God has promised you to take over Khaibar, and it will be so. Do not destroy the palm trees." The Prophet then ordered the Muslims to stop cutting the trees⁴¹. He also advised the Prophet not to approach the fortress of Thaqif⁴². He told Ansar in Saqifa not to leave the throne to Quraish: it should be theirs.⁴³

Such events cannot be justified like what Judge Eiath did. If we admit its truth, it does not mean the Prophet's ignorance of worldly issues: it references the Prophet's chaotic attitudes and absurdity.

Neglecting his previous consultations, as for his opinion on burying the wells of Badr, we may pose the following objections:

1- The issue of war and planning for it, especially the Prophet, is not estranged from it since he is a member of that Arabian culture used to strike and counterstrike; it is greater than the narrow interpretation of the Judge Eiath.

2- It is awkward that the Prophet had already informed them of the fight's results before taking place. He said: "Move and cheer up, for God has promised me to win the fight. I swear by God I

foresee the dead bodies of our enemies”⁴⁴. Muslim has narrated in his book that Omar said: “The Prophet was informing us about the death of our enemies. By God, it was as he said”⁴⁵. In other words, the Prophet was precise at the details of the battle. The question here is that was God unable to guide the Prophet further in other issues, like the camping site of Muslims? How could the Prophet tell them about the battle results and remain silent about the location of camping? This shows that the foreseeing of the Prophet is a divine revelation.

3- The narrators of the event of the advice of Al-Habab are unknown. Ibn Ishaq (died 151 A.H.) mentions: “Some men from Bani Salma told me that...”⁴⁶. Who were these men? Were they contemporary to the events? It seems from the narration that they did not witness the events themselves but were contemporary of Ibn Ishaq. We should consider that Al-Habab bin Al-Munthur belongs to the tribe of Bani Salma⁴⁷. In other words, he belongs to the same tribe as the narrators of this event. The tribal factor probably played a role in the details of this narration. They wanted to sublimate their tribe; mainly, it was the time of boasting about Islamic glories.

4- In case we go back to the primary sources of history, mainly Al-Zuhri (died 124 A.H.)⁴⁸, we do not find any trace of the narration concerning the consultation of Al-Habab bin Al-Munthur, mainly that Al-Zuhri is specialized at narrating the details of Prophetic battles. He is the primary narrator from which other historians like Ibn Ishaq and Al-Waqedi take their narrations⁴⁹. He mentions all the details of Badr and its wells. He narrates that “the Prophet sent two men to survey the route of the caravan of Abu Sufian. Later, they informed the Prophet that Abu Sufian would stop by the wells of Badr. When the caravan reached the place, Abu Sufian recognized what the two informers had done. He changed his way towards the sea. In Medina, Abu Bakr said: Abu Sufian in that specific place, and we are in this place. He suggested a detailed plan for their move. Finally, the Prophet got to the wells of Badr. There, they captivated some of the men of Abu Sufian...”⁵⁰.

As for Musa bin Uqba (died 141 A.H.), he is one of the primary sources of the events of Prophetic battles. He was a student of Al-Zuhri⁵¹. He was praised by many scholars, mainly Malik bin Anas, Al-Shafei, Ahmed bin Hanbal, and others. They advised people to depend on him because he was the most trusted historian in this regard⁵². He also mentioned the Muslim movements similar to Al-Zuhri’s, with further details. However, he never mentions the advice of Al-Habab⁵³. When he finished mentioning the first narration, he moved to the second one when he said “they claim,” referring to the consultation of Al-Habab⁵⁴. Using such terms that give a sense of doubt denotes that this consultation was not recorded previously; it became known in the “era of recording history” (his time and Ibn Ishaq). Thus, neither he nor his master Al-Zuhri mentioned this detail in the movements of the Prophet towards Badr.



5- The story of the consultation of Al-Habab shows that there were numerous wells in the location, whereas, at the end of the battle, we find out that there was only one deep well in which the dead bodies of Quraish were buried⁵⁵. It seems that it did not have any water because it is irrational to bury dead bodies in a well full of water. It must be kept safe to be helpful to the people and animals of that location. Moreover, ordinarily, such places had only one well. Some sources mention that Quraish took over the wells initially, and the Muslims became extremely thirsty⁵⁶. In this context, the advice of Al-Habab becomes irrelevant.

6- Quran refers to the problematic conditions from which the Muslims were suffering due to their need for water: “Remember He covered you with a sort of drowsiness, to give you calm as from Himself, and he caused rain to descend on you from heaven, to clean you in addition to that, to remove from you the stain of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant your feet firmly in addition to that.” Anfal: 11. This Quranic verse defies the consultation of Al-Habab entirely.

7- Other narrations mention that the Muslims camped in a place, the ground of which was of soft sand in which the foot of soldiers and their animals would soak. They could move quickly, drink water, wash their bodies, and sleep to relieve their bodies. At the same time, the rain was a misfortune for Quraish. Later, God helped them make the sky rain to make the ground more stable.⁵⁷

Quran mentions these details, whereas the narration of Al-Habab and the burial of the wells demand further proof. In case we admit the narration of Al-Habab, it can be used against the Prophet because one may say that when the Prophet banned Quraish from drinking water, God assisted them by making it rain. This narration is full of contradictions. It, moreover, does not match the morality of Islam and the Prophet.

As for the stories of palm pollination and weight estimation, by which Judge Eiath wanted to justify the narration of Al-Habab, they result in the same contradictory conclusions. In other words, all three stories are created depending on the same method, seeking to realize one goal: to question the infallibility of the Prophet and the possibility of objecting to his decisions. It allows everyone to give his opinion, even if it opposes the view of the Prophet.

Accordingly, this justifies all the oppositions posed by the Prophet’s companions, especially those who confronted Ahlulbait later. It explains their disobedience to the instructions of the Prophet in his life or after because they claim that they were more knowledgeable than the Prophet and more qualified to give guidelines. The story of palm pollination and weight estimation does not make sense to any person, let alone the Prophet. Moreover, the Prophet was a member of that Arabian society. He was well aware of farming details, or he traded with those products. It seems that the narrator aims to convince us that he had never seen people pollinating palm trees or that

the Prophet suffered from contradictory personality because he could foresee the result by divine revelation; he was a professional person in trade, politics, and to lead those bedwian people. Is it logical that he does not know about the most simple things like palm trees for pollination?

It is deplorable that these court historians present such irrational justifications. The problem is that they do not dare to oppose these irrationalities because they claim that it is impossible to object to any narration from critical Islamic figures, no matter how false and forged they are. As long as they are narrated in the books of Sihah, they must be true⁵⁸.

As for the narration of the pollination of palm trees, it is narrated by Anas bin Malik. The Islamic heritage is full of lies and forgeries. For example, he claims: "I was with the Prophet in one of his trips. We stayed in a town. Then, we heard someone from afar in the valley praying: O God, include me in the nation of Muhammed, which is covered with your mercy. We looked into the valley and saw a very tall man, over three hundred feet. He asked: Who are you? I replied: Anas bin Malik, the servant of the Prophet. He asked about the Prophet. I said: He is listening to you. He said: Go and greet him on my behalf and tell him that your brother Elias welcomes you. I told the Prophet about what happened. He went to meet the man. He greeted and hugged him; then they kept talking. He told the Prophet: Messenger of God, I eat only once a year, and this is the day. Let's eat together. Then a banquet descended from heaven, including bread, fish, and celery. They also gave me from their food. We prayed the afternoon prayer and farewelled Elias. Then we saw him ascending to the sky from among the clouds⁵⁹.

Al-Thahabi commented on this narration: "Did not Al-Hakim feel ashamed before God when he narrated this narration in his Sahih?"⁶⁰ Another source mentions that Al-Thahabi said: "May God curse the one who created this narration. I could not imagine that Al-Hakim would be too ignorant to narrate such nonsense in his book"⁶¹. Ibn Al-Jawzi also comments: "It is forged narration and has no origin."⁶² Ibn Katheer also said: "It is a very weak Hadith. It is extraordinary that Al-Hakim narrates it in his book. It demands further investigation because it is a forged Hadith. It contradicts other true Hadiths. Further, it is nonsense"⁶³. Al-Salehi Al-Shami also mentions other scholars who falsify this Hadith⁶⁴.

The style of Al-Thahabi and Ibn Katheer is skeptical because Al-Hakim Al-Naisaboori did not claim that the Hadith was authentic or believe that it took place. He intended to show that this Hadith is accurate according to the terms of Al-Bukhari and Muslim. The details are imaginative.⁶⁵

Conclusions:

- 1) This study showed a significant gap between what Quran mentions and what is already found in the history books.
- 2) Many forgeries took place in the age of recording Islamic history. They were never present in oral narrations and early recordings. This age was the time of boasting.
- 3) It seems that the narration of the consultation of Al-Habab was created for tribal reasons. It is narrated from unknown people, and the only recognized thing about them is that they belong to the same tribe to which Al-Habab belonged. It is Bani Salma tribe.
- 4) This narration was probably created to invalidate the concept of the infallibility of the Prophet. It seeks to present the Prophet as a person who takes irrational decisions.
- 5) This research shows that the Islamic historical heritage is torn between the sacredness of the Prophet and the impossibility of committing any mistake and his being only a human who commits human errors. Because rejecting the second one would lead to the fall of a long-held ideology of the majority of the Muslims throughout centuries.

- 1) Ahmed bin Hanbal. Musnad, 2/493; Ibn Haban: Sahih, 14/447; Al-Baihaqi: Al-Sunan Al-Kubra, 7/61.
- 2) Al-Bukhari: Sahih, 7/157; Muslim: Sahih, 8/26; Ibn Haban: Sahih, 14/446; Al-Baihaqi: Al-Sunan Al-Kubra 7/61.
- 3) Ibn Abi Shaiba: Al-Musanaf, 7/89; Ahmad bin Hanbal: Musnad, 6/45.
- 4) Ahmad bin Hanbal: Musnad, 6/88.
- 5) Jame'a Al-baian, 22/17.
- 6) Al-Thalabi: Al-Kashf wa Al-baian, 8/47; Al-Wahedi: Al-Wajeez, 2/866.
- 7) Ma'alem Al-Tanzeel, 3/531.
- 8) It means that she was wearing a nightgown. See Lisan Al-Arab, 11/526.
- 9) Al-Jame', 14/190.
- 10) Al-Bukhari: Sahih, 4/22.
- 11) See Abu Hatam Al-Razi: Al-Jarh wa Al-Tadeel, 1/7; Ibn Haban: Sahih, 1/162; Ibn Hazm: Al-Muhala, 5/92; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Estiab, 1/1-2; Al-Estethkar, 3/301; Al-Tamheed, 22/47; Ibn Al-Atheer: Usdul Gaba, 1/3; Ibn Al-Salah: The Introduction of Ibn Al-Salah, 50; Al-Nawawi: Al-Majmoo', 1/62; Al-Athkar Al-Nawawia, 309; Al-Thahabi: Siar Alam Al-Nobala, 2/608; Al-Maqrizi: Emta Al-Asma, 9/32; Al-Demairi: Haiat Al-Haiawan, 1/489; Ibn Hajar: Taghliq Al-Taleeq, 4/12; Al-Aini: Umdat Al-Qare', 1/158.
- 12) Al-Jame Li Ahkam Al-Quran, 16/299.
- 13) Ibn Abi Al-Hadid: Sharh Nahjul Balaga, 16/221.
- 14) Abdul Razaq Al-Sanani: Al-Musanaf, 5/472; Ibn Saad: Al-Tabaqat, 2/351; Ahmad bin Hanbal: Musnad, ¼; Ibn Shaba Al-Numairi: The History of Medina, 1/196-200; Al-Bukhari: Sahih, 4/42; Muslim: Sahih, 5/155; Abu Yali Al-Museli: Musnad, 1/12-13; Al-Tabarani: Al-Mujam Al-Awsat, 4/104-105; Al-Nisaei: Al-Sunan Al-Kubra, 3/46; Abu Dawood: Sunan, 2/23; Ibn Haban: Sahih, 14/573; Al-Baihaqi: Al-Sunan Al-Kubra, 6/300-301.
- 15) Abu Yali Al-Museli: Musnad, 2/334; Al-Hakim Al-Hasakani: Shawahid Al-Tanzeel, 1/438-439, 570, Ibn Katheer: Interpretation of the Great Quran, 3/39; Al-Saiooti: Al-Dur Al-Manthoor, 4/177; Lubab Al-Noqool, 123; Al-Haithami: Majma Al-Zawa'ed, 7/49.
- 16) Al-Jasas: Ahkam Al-Quran, 1/161; Al-Thahabi: Tathkera AL-Hifad, 1/3.
- 17) See Nabeel Fazino: The Imaginative Prophet, 181-182.
- 18) See Mahmood Shakir: The Islamic History (the second part – Biography), 164-169; Akram Dia Al-Omari: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/345-348.
- 19) See Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/427-443.
- 20) The Life of Muhammed, 255-257.
- 21) It is an interpretation which was adopted by many researchers like Mahmood Shakir: The Islamic History (vol2, The Biography), 163-164; Akram Dia Al-Omari: The True Biography of the Prophet, 2/345.
- 22) The Life of Muhammed, 257-258.
- 23) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/431.
- 24) The Life of Muhammed, 258-259.
- 25) See Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/452; Al-Tabari: History, 2/144; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Durar, 105; Ibn Katheer: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/402.
- 26) Ibn Maja: Sunan, 2/826; Ibn Hajar: Al-Diraia fi Takhreej Ahadith Al-Hidaia, 2/246; Al-Saiooti: Al-Jame' Al-Sageer, 1/547.



- 27) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/440-447.
- 28) Al-Waqedi: Magazi, 1/48-49; Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/447-448.
- 29) Ahmad bin Hanbal: Musnad, 3/219-220; Muslim: Sahih, 5/170; Ibn Asakir: The History of Damascus 60/159; Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 2/82; Al-Nawawi: The Interpretation of Muslim, 12/124; Al-Mutaqi Al-Hindi: Kanzul Umal, 10/423; Al-Salehi AL-Shami: Subul Al-Husa wa Al-Rashad, 4/80; 9/110.
- 30) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/447; Al-Tabari: The History, 2/140; Ibn Haban: The Trusted, 1/157; Ibn Sayed Al-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/327; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/320; The Biography of the Prophet, 2/391; Al-Salehi Al-Shami: Subul Al-Husa wa Al-Rashad, 4/26; Al-Halabi: Al-Sira Al-Halabia, 2/385.
- 31) Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 1/48; Al-Maqrizi: Emta Al-Asma, 1/94.
- 32) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/428.
- 33) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/558; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Durar, 139; Ibn Sayed Al-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/384; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/415; Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 2/137.
- 34) Al-Waqedi: Al-Magazi, 1/182; Al-Maqrizi: Imta' Al-Asma', 1/129; Al-Salehi Al-Shami: Subul Al-Husa wa Al-Rashad, 4/172.
- 35) Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 1/53-54; Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/452; Al-Tabari: The History, 2/144; Judge Eiath: Al-Shifa in Introducing the Rights of Al-Mustafa, 2/184-185; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Durar, 105; Ibn Al-Atheer: Usdul Gaba, 1/365; Al-Kamil fi Al-Tarik, 2/122; Ibn Abil Hadid: The Interpretation of Nahjul Balaga, 14/116; Ibn Sayed Al-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/332; Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 2/108; Al-Maqrizi: Emta Al-Asma, 9/243; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/326-327; The History of the Prophet, 2/402.
- 36) Judge Eiath: Al-Shifa in Introducing the Rights of Al-Mustafa, 2/115, 184-185.
- 37) Judge Eiath: Al-Shifa in Introducing the Rights of Al-Mustafa, 2/184. And see Ahmed bin Hanbal: Musnad, 3/152; Muslim: Sahih, 7/95; Ibn Maja: Sunan, 2/825.
- 38) Ibn Haban: Tabaqat AL-Muhadetheen bi Esbahan, 1/425-426; Al-Hafid Al-Asbahani: The News of Isfahan, 1/305; Al-Haithami: Majma Al-Zawa'ed, 1/178; Al-Salehi Al-Shami: Subul Al-Rashad, 12/7. And see Judge Eiath: Al-Shifa in Introducing the Rights of Al-Mustafa, 2/184.
- 39) Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 3/286; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 7/160; Al-Maqrizi: Emta' Al-Asma', 9/236; Al-Sadafi: Al-Wafi Bel Wafaiat, 11/216; Al-Sakawi: Al-Tuhfa Al-Latiifa, 1/261; Al-Halabi: Al-Sira Al-Halabia, 2/394.
- 40) Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 2/643.
- 41) Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 2/644.
- 42) Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles.
- 43) Al-Tabari: The History, 2/457-459.
- 44) Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/448; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Durar, 103; Ibn Sayed Al-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/329.
- 45) Muslim: Sahih, 8/163; Abu Dawood: Sunan, 1/606; Abu Yali Al-Museli: Musnad, 1/130; Al-Tabarani: Al-Mujam Al-Awsat, 8/219; Al-Mujam Al-Sageer, 2/113; Ibn Sayed AL-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/335; Al-Maqrizi: Emta' Al-Asma', 12/142.
- 46) See Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 1/498; Al-Balatheri: Ansab Al-Ashraf, 1/584., 2/452; Al-Tabari: The History, 2/144; Ibn Sayed AL-Nas: Uyoon Al-Athar, 1/332; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia Al-Nihaia: 3/326.

- 47) See Al-Waqedi: The Prophetic Battles, 1/498; Al-Balatheri: Ansab Al-Ashraf, 1/584.
- 48) He is Muhammed bin Muslim bin Ubaidullah bin Abdullah bin Shahab from Bani Zura. His date of birth is indefinite. It ranges from 50 to 58 A.H. Hurfuts: The Early Books on the Battles of the Prophet and their Authors, 50. His second grandfather fought on the side of the unbelievers in the battles of Badr and Uhud. Ibn Qutaiba: Al-Maarif, 472; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Estiab, 3/927; Ibn Al-Atheer: Usdul Gaba, 3/184. He was very close the Umayyads caliphs and their trustee at narrating Hadiths. See Ibn Saad: Al-Tabaqat, 7/429-432; Al-Yaqoobi: The History, 2/261; Ibn Abdul Bar: Al-Tamheed, 6/106; Al-Hakim AL-Naisaboori: Knowing the Sciences of Hadith, 10; Al-Thahabi: Tathkira Al-Hufad, 1/110; Siar Alam Al-Nubala, 5/326.
- 49) See Al-Zuhri: The Prophetic Battles, 30-31 (Edited) Dr. Suhail Zakar edited it depending on the book of Abdul Razaq Al-Sanani and the book of Tabaqat by Ibn Saad.
- 50) Al-Zuhri: The Prophetic Battles, 62-63; Abdul Razaq Al-Sanani: Al-Musanaf, 5/348-349; The Interpretation of Quran, 2/251-252.
- 51) From him and from The Prophetic Battles. See the introduction of Jami Al-Kitab, 15-32.
- 52) Musa bin Aqaba: The Prophetic battles, 18-21 (Jami Al-Kitab – The Introduction)
- 53) Musa bin Aqaba: The Prophetic Battles, 127-130.
- 54) Musa bin Aqaba: The Prophetic Battles, 130-131.
- 55) See Ibn Husham: The Biography of the Prophet, 2/549; Ibn Abi Shabib: Al-Musanaf, 8/441; Ahmad bin Hanbal: Musnad, 2/38; 3/104, 220; Al-Bukhari: Sahih, 1/65-66, 132; 3/234; 4/263; 5/9; Muslim: Sahih, 8/164; Abu dawood: Sunan, 1/606; Al-Tabari: Jami Al-Baian, 2/493; Ibn Haban: Sahih, 14/424; Al-Nisaei: Sunan, 4/110; Al-Baihaqi: Al-Sunan Al-Kubra, 9/8; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/412; The Biography of the Prophet, 2/535-536.
- 56) Al-Tabari: Jami Al-Baian, 9/259; Al-Thalabi: Al-Kashf wa Al-Baian, 4/33; Al-Bagawi: Ma'alim Al-Tanzeel, 2/234; Ibn Al-Jawzi: Zad Al-Maseer, 3/222; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/345; The Biography of the Prophet, 2/432; Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 2/94; Al-Aini: Umda Al-Qarei, 17/79; Al-Maqrizi: Emta' Al-Asma', 3/320; Al-Salehi Al-Shami: Subul Al-Rashad, 4/29; Al-Halabi: Al-Sira Al-Halabia, 2/392.
- 57) Al-Waqedi: Al-Magazi, 1/54; Ibn Saad: Al-Tabaqat Al-Kubra, 2/15; Al-Tabari: Jami Al-Baian, 9/259; Al-Thalabi: Al-Kashf wa Al-baian, 4/33; Al-Bagaqi: Ma'alim Al-Tanzeel, 2/234; Ibn Al-Jawzi: Zad Al-Maseer, 3/222; Ibn Abi Al-Hadid: The Interpretation fo Nahjul Balaga, 4/116-117; Ibn Katheer: Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 3/345; The Biography of the Prophet, 2/432; Al-Thahabi: The History of Islam, 2/94; Al-Aini: Umda Al-Qari, 17/79; Al-Maqrizi: Emta Al-Asma, 1/98; 3/320; Al-Salehi Al-Shami: Subul Al-Huda Al-Rashad, 4/29; Al-Halabi: Al-Sira Al-Halabia, 2/329.
- 58) For more examples, see Al-Kurani: One Thousand and One Issue, 2/173-266.
- 59) Al-Hakim Al-Naisaboori: Al-Mustadrak, 2/617. See Ibn Abi Al-Dunia: Al-Hawatif, 79; Al-Qurtubi: Al-Jami, 15/116; Ibn Hajar: Al-Isaba, 2/263-264.
- 60) Mizan Al-Etidal, 4/441; Ibn Hajar: Lisan Al-Mizan, 6/296.
- 61) Sibt Ibn Al-Ajmi: Al-Kashf Al-Hatheeth, 282; Al-Sayooti: Al-Dur Al-Manthoor, 5/286.
- 62) Al-Mawdooat, 1/200.
- 63) Al-Bidaia wa Al-Nihaia, 1/395; The Stories of the Prophets, 2/244.
- 64) Subul Al-Huda wa Al-Rashad, 6/435.
- 65) Al-Mustadrak, 1/2-3.



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